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Meghan Claire Hammond 
ABSTRACT—This Note analyzes instances of U.S. detention of suspected 
terrorists while at sea as an alternative to Guantánamo, and how this at-sea 
detention fits in the interplay of U.S. statutory law, procedural law, and 
applicable international law. Of particular interest is the dual use of 
military and civilian legal regimes to create a procedural-protection-free 
zone on board U.S. warships during a detainee’s transfer from their place 
of capture to the U.S. court system. The Note concludes that U.S. Army 
Regulation 190–8 contains language of which the purpose and intent may 
be analogized to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requirements of 
presentment. The language of Army Regulation 190–8 has not been 
analyzed by scholars or courts in this context. This Note’s analysis 
provides a check against extended detentions at sea by shortening the 
amount of time detainees spend in a procedural-protection-free zone while 
still allowing the government to obtain information crucial to national 
security. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years the United States government has struggled to balance 
the interests of liberty and national security.1 Much of this debate was 
centered on the detainees at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba,2 however, as the 
Obama Administration has made efforts to wind down the facility,3 other 
detention procedures were employed by the Administration.4 This Note will 
focus on one of those detention procedures, the holding of suspected 
terrorists on naval warships for questioning—otherwise known as detention 
at sea. 
There have been several cases of suspected terrorists held on naval 
warships for questioning after capture since Obama took office: Ahmed 
 
1 David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 955 (2002). 
2 See id. at 954–55. 
3 The Guantánamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees 
[perma.cc/N83Z-TK4C] (noting that of the approximately 780 detainees only 91 remain at the time of 
this writing). 
4 See, e.g., Robert Harward, Vice Admiral, Commander, Combined Joint Interagency Task Force 
435, Department of Defense News Briefing (Nov. 30, 2010), http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/
Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4727 [http://perma.cc/FNZ6-MGMA] (discussing an increase in capacity 
of detention facilities in Afghanistan). But see Emma Graham-Harrison, U.S. Finally Closes Detention 
Facility at Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 11, 2014 1:29 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/afghanistan-us-bagram-torture-prison [perma.cc/C9P6-
KWNU]. 
110:1303 (2016) Without Unnecessary Delay 
1305 
Abdulkadir Warsame,5 Abu Anas al-Libi,6 and, most recently, Abu 
Khattalah.7 International law scholars have written that detention at sea is 
barred by Article 22 of the Third Geneva Convention (GC III), which 
provides that prisoners of war be kept “on land.”8 Conversely, other 
commentators have argued for detention at sea as both a legally and 
politically feasible alternative to Guantánamo, as well as an easier way to 
transfer the accused into the United States court system.9 
Analysis of detention-at-sea cases suggest the United States is moving 
to a strategic two-step system for detaining terrorists generally. The first 
step is to detain suspected terrorists on board a naval warship in military 
custody, and the second is to use the naval warship to transfer them into the 
civilian U.S. court system—interrogating them all the while. The increase 
in frequency of these operations suggests this method of detention may 
become a modus operandi for this and future administrations. 
This Note explores how the U.S. government is using detention at sea 
to evade applicable law and expand the amount of procedural-protection-
free interrogation time available for questioning terrorism suspects. Part I 
of this Note provides a brief historical background of detention at sea and 
the motivations for drafting Article 22 of the GC III. Further, this Part will 
summarize the relevant case law on at-sea detention. 
Part II demonstrates how the United States is using detention at sea to 
evade three tiers of applicable law. The first tier, international law, is 
circumvented through the categorization of suspected terrorists as 
“unprivileged belligerents,” rendering the prisoner-of-war protections of 
 
5 Benjamin Weiser & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Said to Hold Qaeda Suspect on Navy Ship, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/world/africa/a-terrorism-suspect-long-known-to-
prosecutors.html?pagewanted=all [perma.cc/3LPX-PYB2]. 
6 Gordon Modarai et al., The Seizure of Abu Anas Al-Libi: An International Law Assessment, 
89 INT’L L. STUD. 817 (2013). 
7 Jonathan Hafetz, Abu Khattalah and the Evolution of Ship-Based Detention, JUST SECURITY (June 
28, 2014, 12:53 PM), http://justsecurity.org/12395/abu-khattalah-evolution-ship-based-detention/ 
[perma.cc/4GST-2XGC]. 
8 See, e.g., John Bellinger, Do the Geneva Conventions Apply to the Detention of al-Libi?, 
LAWFARE (Oct. 7, 2013 11:21 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/10/do-the-geneva-conventions-
apply-to-the-detention-of-al-libi/ [perma.cc/Y2J4-RTNL]. Additionally, while the Third Geneva 
Convention and its commentary explicitly prohibit the internment of enemy combatants on naval 
vessels, the Second Geneva Convention Articles 12 and 16 provide authority for the detention and 
treatment of “wounded, sick, and shipwrecked” opposing forces. See Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces 
at Sea arts. 12, 16, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II]. 
9 See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Al-Libi and Detention at Sea, LAWFARE (Oct. 10, 2013 5:00 PM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/10/al-libi-and-detention-at-sea/ [perma.cc/68DJ-MZJJ]. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1306 
the Geneva Conventions inapplicable. The second tier, federal statutory 
law, demonstrates how the Executive is explicitly evading congressional 
intent by detaining suspected terrorists at sea. Finally, by detaining 
prisoners at sea, the Executive circumvents a third tier—constitutional 
procedural law. Specifically, the United States uses the dual regimes of 
military detention and civilian criminal prosecution to effectively create a 
procedural-protection-free site on the vessel in which the High-Value 
Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG) can question a suspected terrorist in 
transit.10 
Part III analyzes the applicability of the heretofore underexplored 
Army Regulation (AR) 190–8 as a potential avenue to provide procedural 
protections to detainees. Because AR 190–8 is one of the only sources of 
law applicable to detainees at sea, this Note makes a textual argument that 
temporary detention on board naval vessels should be “limited to the 
minimum period necessary to evacuate [detainees] from the combat zone or 
to avoid significant harm that would be faced if detained on land.”11 
Specifically, the “minimum period necessary” language of AR 190–8 is so 
close in meaning to the “without unnecessary delay” language of Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a)(1)(A)12 that the Supreme Court’s language 
in Corley v. United States should be applicable to detainees.13 
Consequentially, if a detainee is unnecessarily held for additional 
questioning rather than being presented before a magistrate judge, and thus 
held in violation of AR 190–8, a motion to suppress the detainee’s 
statements per the McNabb–Mallory rule is applicable.14 While these 
consequences may initially appear limited in today’s context, this analysis 
 
10 Charlie Savage & Benjamin Weiser, How the U.S. Is Interrogating a Qaeda Suspect, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/08/world/africa/q-and-a-on-interrogation-of-libyan-
suspect.html [perma.cc/HCH2-VX88]; see also Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Special Task Force on 
Interrogations and Transfer Policies Issues Its Recommendations to the President (Aug. 24, 2009), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/special-task-force-interrogations-and-transfer-policies-issues-its-
recommendations-president [perma.cc/EVL9-K22V] (announcing the formation of the High-Value 
Detainee Interrogation Group, an interagency entity, to “improve . . . [the government’s] ability to 
interrogate the most dangerous terrorists”). 
11 Headquarters of Dep’ts of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, Army Reg. 
190–8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees para. 2-
1(f)(2)(b)(4) (1997), http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r190_8.pdf [perma.cc/C4LN-U33T] [hereinafter 
AR 190–8]. 
12 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)(1)(A). 
13 Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 308 (2009) (“[D]elay for the purpose of interrogation is 
the epitome of ‘unnecessary delay.’”). 
14 See id. at 316 (“As we explained before and as the Government concedes, McNabb–Mallory 
makes even voluntary confessions inadmissible if given after an unreasonable delay in presentment.”). 
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should serve to protect against extended detentions at sea by shortening the 
amount of time detainees spend in a procedural-protection-free 
environment and ultimately serve the dual goals of obtaining information 
crucial to national security while complying with the law. 
I. DETENTION AT SEA AND THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT 
A. Brief History of Detention at Sea 
Detaining persons and prisoners of war on board naval warships15 has 
been a part of United States history since the American Revolutionary 
War.16 The United States continues to assert this authority in modern 
warfare as evidenced by the most recent operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.17 Because of the tainted history of sea-based detentions, 
international human rights organizations and the United Nations have a 
heightened interest in monitoring detentions of persons on warships.18 This 
Section will briefly outline that history under the Laws of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC) and the applicable rules for detention of prisoners of war, enemy 
belligerents, and civilians. 
Detention at sea has always been a common occurrence in naval 
warfare. Britain detained over 11,000 American prisoners of war during the 
American Revolution.19 In World War II (WWII), the Japanese imprisoned 
Americans on both merchant ships and warships.20 Besides being forced to 
 
15 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 29, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 
408 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (defining a “warship” as “a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State 
bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer 
duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose name appears in the appropriate service 
list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.”). 
16 When the British captured New York City in 1776, so many American prisoners fell into British 
hands that when the jails filled, enemy prisoners were forced to live on board the HMS Jersey where 
abhorrent conditions resulted in their deaths. More Americans died as prisoners of the British during the 
Revolutionary War due to these types of conditions than died in battle. JOHN LEHMAN, ON SEAS OF 
GLORY: HEROIC MEN, GREAT SHIPS, AND EPIC BATTLES OF THE AMERICAN NAVY 15–18 (2002). 
17 See generally JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31367, TREATMENT OF 
“BATTLEFIELD DETAINEES” IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 1–10 (2007), 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl31367.pdf [perma.cc/GJR2-XEM4]. 
18 Major Winston G. McMillan, Something More Than a Three-Hour Tour: Rules for Detention 
and Treatment of Persons at Sea on U.S. Naval Warships, 2011 ARMY LAW. 31, 32 (2011). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at n.13 (“In World War II, the Japanese interned American prisoners of war on warships and 
freighters dubbed ‘Hell Ships.’ On these ships, American POWs were made to perform slave labor and 
were exposed to harsh sanitary conditions. Additionally the POWs were placed in substantial risk of 
harm from attack by the American Pacific Fleet.”). 
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do slave labor, the detainees encountered limited space on these ships, 
making for cramped conditions, increased incidents of disease, and a high 
onboard death toll.21 In what was perhaps one of the greatest American 
tragedies of WWII, U.S. submarines misidentified these “Hell Ships” as 
being engaged in conflict and sank at least five of them, which resulted in 
thousands of American prisoner-of-war (POW) deaths at the hands of our 
own military.22 
While the Second Geneva Convention (GC II) provides authority for 
detention and treatment of “wounded, sick and shipwrecked” enemy armed 
forces,23 the extremely negative experience of the Japanese prison ships 
directly informed the climate in which Articles 22 and 23 of the GC III 
were drafted in 1949 after the war’s conclusion.24 Article 22 provides in 
part: 
Prisoners of war may be interned only in premises located on land and 
affording every guarantee of hygiene and healthfulness. Except in particular 
cases which are justified by the interest of the prisoners themselves, they shall 
not be interned in penitentiaries.25 
Article 23 then goes on to protect prisoners of war from being 
detained in combat zones and stipulates that prisoners must have 
protections from other “hazards of war.”26 Thus, the text of the GC III 
makes apparent the international community was trying to avoid repeating 
these atrocities and any POW is not to be detained on board a U.S. naval 
warship. Furthermore, the Fourth Geneva Convention (GC IV)—while not 
 
21 Gregory P. Noone et. al., Prisoners of War in the 21st Century: Issues in Modern Warfare, 
50 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 22 (2004); see also GARY K. REYNOLDS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30606, U.S. 
PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN AMERICAN CITIZENS CAPTURED AND INTERNED BY JAPAN IN 
WORLD WAR II: THE ISSUE OF COMPENSATION BY JAPAN 12–13 (2007), 
https://fas.org/man/crs/RL30606.pdf [perma.cc/E3PC-CGYR]. 
22 Noone et. al., supra note 21, at 22. 
23 GC II, supra note 8, at art. 16. 
24 McMillan, supra note 18, at 32; see also Noone et. al., supra note 21, at 21 (“[Article 22] of the 
Geneva Conventions was most likely made explicit in [Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949] in response to the use of ships to intern prisoners of war during 
World War II.”). 
25 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 22, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III] (emphasis added). 
26 Id. at art. 23. 
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relating to naval vessels specifically—provides for limitations on the 
treatment of civilians at sea which will be discussed later in Part II.27 
While several international laws apply to persons detained at sea 
during armed conflict, there is also the task of identifying the U.S. laws that 
govern these detentions. Fortunately, the authority for detention of enemy 
combatants under the laws of war is well-settled doctrine.28 As Chief 
Justice Stone held in Ex parte Quirin: 
Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by 
opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture 
and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by 
military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful.29  
However, while this detention authority also applies in international 
law, as discussed above, Article 22 of the GC III specifically prohibits 
detentions which do not occur “on land,” therefore encompassing any 
detentions on board a naval war vessel.30 
Despite the clear textual instruction, these types of detentions have 
taken place since the GC III was signed in 1949. Specifically, during the 
Falklands War in 1982, it became necessary for the safety and security of 
Argentine enemy prisoners of war to be interned on British naval vessels.31 
With winter fast approaching and thousands of prisoner tents lost during 
the sinking of the Atlantic Conveyor, the decision was made to create a 
neutral zone in which to intern the Argentines on board British warships 
prior to their repatriation.32 The United States generally follows the tenets 
 
27 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]. 
28 McMillan, supra note 18, at 33; see e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 597 (2006) 
(“Quirin represents the high-water mark of military power to try enemy combatants for war crimes.” 
(citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942))). 
29 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31. 
30 GC III, supra note 25, at art. 22. 
31 Noone et al., supra note 21, at 27–28 n.131 (“The dispute between Argentina and Britain 
regarding possession of the Falkland Islands dates back to the Argentine claim over the islands starting 
in 1820 and settlement of the islands in 1826. Britain never accepted Argentina’s claim over the islands 
and began occupying the islands in 1833. This tension existed for many years, and the Falklands War 
erupted in April 1982 when Argentina invaded and took control of the islands. In 1980, the barren 
islands were home to a mere 1,813 inhabitants as stated by the census for that year. During the war, the 
British captured over 10,000 Argentine prisoners of war.”). 
32 Id. at 28 (“The United Kingdom and Argentina orally agreed to create a ‘Red Cross Box’ on the 
high seas located to the north of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. This informal agreement facilitated the 
helicopter transfers of wounded prisoners of war from hospital ship to hospital ship within the ‘Red 
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of the Falklands example, citing humanitarian need under LOAC for the 
temporary detention of enemy prisoners of war at sea.33 
However, since 2001, the United States has strayed from this 
humanitarian justification.34 In 2002, several top al-Qaeda operatives were 
held and questioned on the U.S.S. Bataan before being transferred to the 
facilities at Guantánamo Bay, which were still being built at the time.35 
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S.S. Dubuque also served as a 
temporary detention facility for Iraqi enemy prisoners of war due to a lack 
of land-based facilities.36 During the Falklands War, Argentina and Britain 
were two nation-states that had the capability to mutually agree on 
detention practices; this has not been the case for the United States and al-
Qaeda.37 
B. Detention at Sea in the Age of Terrorism 
Whatever the historical justifications for detention at sea, the practice 
has clearly changed. This Section reviews the current cases of detention at 
sea to demonstrate how the process has gone from housing massive 
amounts of individuals to a few suspected terrorists. The question here is 
how do laws shaped by the historical events apply in the age of terrorism, if 
at all. 
1. The Case of Jose Padilla (2002).—Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen, 
was arrested at Chicago O’Hare International Airport in May 2002 for his 
alleged involvement in a terrorist plot to explode a radioactive “dirty 
bomb” in the United States in conjunction with al-Qaeda.38 In early June 
2002, President Bush issued a memorandum describing Padilla as an 
 




35 See Eric Schmitt & Erik Eckholm, U.S. Takes Custody of a Qaeda Trainer Seized by Pakistan, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/06/international/asia/06DETA.html 
[https://perma.cc/AW9C-GVBA] (“Military and other government investigators are interrogating a total 
of 307 Taliban and Al Qaeda prisoners at three sites in Afghanistan and on the Bataan. The first group 
of detainees is scheduled to be flown under heavy guard later this month to a secure jail being built at 
the United States Navy base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.”). 
36 McMillan, supra note 18, at 36. 
37 Noone et al., supra note 21, at 28. 
38 See Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 388 (4th Cir. 2005) (summarizing the background of the 
case); Deborah Sontag, Terror Suspect’s Path from Streets to Brig, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/25/us/terror-suspect-s-path-from-streets-to-brig.html [perma.cc/
WCV3-74NU]. 
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enemy combatant against the United States and directed the Secretary of 
Defense to take Padilla into military custody.39 The June memorandum 
cited both the U.S. Constitution and the Authorization for Use of Military 
Force Joint Resolution (AUMF) as authority for this action.40 Padilla 
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Southern District of New York, 
claiming his detention violated the Constitution.41 The Supreme Court held 
that Padilla’s petition was improperly filed with the Southern District of 
New York and his case was dismissed without prejudice.42 
Padilla was subsequently held in military custody in a naval brig 
outside of Charleston, South Carolina for three years until his case was 
brought before the Fourth Circuit.43 During this three-year period of 
detention, Padilla was not charged with a crime and given only limited 
access to legal counsel.44 
Padilla was finally indicted by federal authorities in November 2005.45 
At the time, some scholars theorized that the federal government sought the 
indictment against Padilla to avoid putting before the Supreme Court the 
issue of how long American citizens can be detained in military prisons.46 
Despite this, Judge Luttig of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals waded 
into the issue, upholding Padilla’s status as an enemy combatant and 
subsequent detention by closely analogizing Padilla’s case to that of Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, stating that the court “could discern no difference” between 
Hamdi and Padilla.47 While Padilla’s case was not a case of detention at 
 
39 Padilla, 423 F.3d at 388. 
40 Id. at 389. 
41 Id. at 390. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 See Sontag, supra note 38 (explaining Padilla’s status as of 2004, when he was detained as an 
enemy combatant, and his limited access to lawyers); see also Eric Lichtblau, In Legal Shift, U.S. 
Charges Detainee in Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/23/politics/in-legal-shift-us-charges-detainee-in-terrorism-case.html 
[https://perma.cc/6ECB-DNYS]. 
45 See David Stout, U.S. Indicts Padilla After 3 Years in Pentagon Custody, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/22/politics/us-indicts-padilla-after-3-years-in-pentagon-
custody.html [https://perma.cc/W44B-MBQT] (“The indictment, which was returned by a federal grand 
jury in Miami, said that Mr. Padilla had plotted with four co-defendants in South Florida and elsewhere 
from October 1993 to the fall of 2001 to promote terrorist activities overseas.”). 
46 Id. 
47 Padilla, 423 F.3d at 391 (“Under the facts as presented here, Padilla unquestionably qualifies as 
an ‘enemy combatant’ as that term was defined for purposes of the controlling opinion in Hamdi.”); see 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
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sea,48 Judge Luttig’s decision began to pave the way for the United States 
to initially hold persons under military custody and later transfer them to 
civilian criminal courts. 
2. The Case of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame (2011).—Warsame—a 
former military commander of the Somali terrorist group Shabab—was 
captured in 2011 off the Gulf of Aden, detained aboard a warship, and 
questioned for two months without being read his Miranda rights or given 
access to a lawyer.49 This questioning was carried out in a two-step process 
alluded to in Justice Kennedy’s separate concurring opinion in Missouri v. 
Seibart.50 First, the military’s High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group 
questioned Warsame for about two months.51 After the initial questioning, 
he was given a few days to meet with a Red Cross representative.52 When 
the questioning started up again, it was conducted by FBI agents who 
finally read Warsame his Miranda warnings.53 After questioning, Warsame 
was brought to the United States and tried in the Southern District of New 
York.54 In December 2011, mere months after his capture, Warsame 
entered a guilty plea.55 
 
48 The U.S. Naval Consolidated Brig is located at the Charleston Naval Weapons Station in North 
Charleston. Charleston Visitor Information, NAVY PERSONNEL COMMAND (May 31, 2013 9:24 AM)
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/support/correctionprograms/brigs/charleston/Pages/
VisitorInformation.aspx [https://perma.cc/2THN-ZYSE]. 
49 Benjamin Weiser & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Said to Hold Qaeda Suspect on Navy Ship, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/world/africa/a-terrorism-suspect-long-known-to-
prosecutors.html?pagewanted=all [perma.cc/EC44-7WW2]. 
50 In Seibert, a plurality of the Supreme Court struck down a two-step method of police questioning 
which would obtain a confession in the first step and, once the defendant had confessed, in the second 
step the authorities would read her Miranda rights, remind her of the earlier confession and obtain a 
second Mirandized confession. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 617 (2004). Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence applied a narrower test: “I would apply a narrower test applicable only in the infrequent 
case, such as we have here, in which the two-step interrogation technique was used in a calculated way 
to undermine the Miranda warning.” Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
51 Norman Abrams, Responses to the Five Questions, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1597, 1603 
(2012). 
52 Id. at 1603–04. 
53 Id. at 1604; see also Letter to Judge Colleen McMahon, at 2 n.1, United States v. Ahmed 
Abdulkadir Warsame, No. 1:11-cr-0059-CM (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2011), (describing the two-step process 
by which Warsame was first interviewed by officials “acting in a non-law-enforcement capacity” for 
approximately two months, given a four-day break, and then granted a Mirandized law enforcement 
interview). 
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Detaining Warsame on board a warship provided a convenient legal 
route for the Obama Administration. Because the Administration was 
trying to close Guantánamo and did not want to send any new detainees to 
Cuba, it appears that the detention of Warsame on board a naval war vessel 
on the high seas (considered U.S. territory)56 was a calculated decision 
meant to avoid Guantánamo and get Warsame into the federal court system 
quickly.57 In fact, Warsame’s case demonstrates a “calculated progression” 
on the part of the military to easily transition subjects from military custody 
into the civilian court system, as opposed to the previous haphazard path of 
the Padilla case.58 
3. The Case of Abu Anas al-Libi (2013).—In October of 2013, U.S. 
forces captured and detained Abu Anas al-Libi in Tripoli, Libya.59 Al-Libi 
was allegedly at one time a senior al-Qaeda operative with close ties to 
Osama bin Laden.60 After only eight days of questioning on board the 
U.S.S. San Antonio, al-Libi was transferred to the United States to be tried 
in the Southern District of New York.61 Al-Libi died in government custody 
on January 2, 2015 while awaiting trial.62 
In an analysis of the legality of al-Libi’s detention under international 
law, military law scholars dismissed the issue for two primary reasons: (1) 
the United States is not defined as being in an “armed conflict” with al-
Qaeda, but rather a noninternational armed conflict and (2) despite the 
United States expressly incorporating the Geneva Conventions, al-Libi did 
 
56 Under the law of the flag doctrine, ships—even merchant ships—are deemed to be under the 
territory of the sovereign whose flag they fly on the high seas. For a concise, modern description of this 
doctrine, see United States v. Sanford Ltd., 880 F. Supp. 2d 9, 16 (D.D.C. 2012). 
57 Abrams, supra note 51, at 1601 (“Detaining Warsame on shipboard during the first period of 
interrogation was the administration’s way of holding him in military custody for a period of time 
without sending him to Guantánamo or a military facility on the mainland. Because the administration 
is trying to close the Guantánamo detention facility, it avoids sending any new detainees there. 
Meanwhile, Congress has acted to prevent sending any new detainees to any military detention facility 
in the United States.”). 
58 Id. at 1602 (“What arguably differentiates the Warsame case is the fact that, unlike Padilla and 
al-Marri, where the government appeared to have backed into the sequence of military detention 
followed by civilian prosecution, for Warsame, it seems to have been a calculated progression.”). 
59 Modarai et al., supra note 6, at 817. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 817–18; Deborah Feyerick & Lateef Mungin, Alleged al Qaeda Operative Abu Anas al 
Libi Pleads Not Guilty, CNN (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/15/justice/al-libi-
case/index.html [https://perma.cc/GHY3-A9Z80]. 
62 Benjamin Weiser & Michael Schmidt, Qaeda Suspect Facing Trial in New York Over Africa 
Embassy Bombings Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/04/
us/politics/qaeda-suspect-facing-trial-in-new-york-dies-in-custody.html [perma.cc/4TYB-9YHT]. 
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not qualify as a POW under the Geneva Conventions and was therefore not 
afforded the protection of Article 22.63 The merits of these categorizations 
will be explored in Part III.64 
4. The Case of Ahmed Abu Khattalah (2014).—Ahmed Abu 
Khattalah—a suspect in the 2012 Benghazi attacks—was arrested in June 
of 2014 after a Libyan raid.65 Khattalah’s case differs somewhat from the 
cases of Warsame and al-Libi in that he did not have the requisite 
connection to al-Qaeda in order for the AUMF to apply (though, 
importantly, an al-Qaeda connection is not required for the new AUMF 
Obama proposed in his 2015 State of the Union Address).66 He was 
detained and questioned, however, under the “public safety” exception of 
Miranda while the U.S. Naval vessel he was aboard sailed nearly two 
weeks from the Mediterranean to Washington, D.C.67 As an indication that 
the interrogation team had not been able to retrieve all of the desired 
information from Khattalah, upon his arrival in the United States he was 
given the choice of whether to be presented before a judge or to continue 
the interrogation.68 He chose the judge.69 
These cases suggest a calculated progression on the part of military 
officials to strategically utilize detention at sea for the interrogation of 
 
63 Modarai et al., supra note 6, at 833. 
64 Id. at 834 (“The absolutism of Article 22’s prohibition against at-sea detention for prisoners of 
war has been questioned, even in the context of GC III. For example, the ICRC calls for the ‘sensible 
interpretation’ of Article 22. This is because historically the article had two motivations. First, during 
the Second World War prisoners of war had been held in ships in unsanitary and unsafe conditions, in 
particular by Japan. Second, belligerent ships (a fortiori warships) were at significant risk of enemy 
attack, potentially placing any prisoners in danger. These factors are now of less concern than they were 
at the time of Article 22’s drafting.” (footnote omitted)). 
65 Hafetz, supra note 7. 
66 Id.; see also Authorization for Use of Military Force against the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant, Joint Resolution, THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb 11, 2015), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/docs/aumf_02112015.pdf [https://perma.cc/DK4D-ZM4Z] (defining “associated 
persons or forces” as “individuals and organizations fighting for, on behalf of, or alongside ISIL or any 
closely-related successor entity”). 
67 Michael S. Schmidt & Eric Schmitt, Suspect in Benghazi Attack is Arraigned in U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES (June 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/29/world/africa/libyan-suspected-in-
benghazi-mission-attack-arrives-in-washington.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/Y7UN-MVWR]. Also of 
note is that, according to the New York Times, the sailing time of the vessel was extended due to 
“engineering issues.” Michael S. Schmidt & Eric Schmitt, Questions Raised Over Trial for Ahmed Abu 
Khattala in Benghazi Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/
world/africa/questions-raised-over-trial-for-ahmed-abu-khattala-in-benghazi-case.html[perma.cc/
2AKB-MRBV]. 
68 Schmidt & Schmitt, Suspect in Benghazi Attack is Arraigned in U.S., supra note 67. 
69 Id. 
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suspected terrorists. The Padilla case in 2002 marked the beginning of a 
more systematic practice of first detaining a suspect militarily and then 
transferring them into civilian criminal custody for prosecution. As it 
became more difficult for the Executive to transfer detainees from 
Guantánamo,70 the Administration has resorted to the strategies used in the 
cases of Warsame, al-Libi, and Khattalah, first capturing the suspects 
overseas and then transferring them by warship into the hands of the 
civilian courts.71 These cases also demonstrate that, as the Administration 
has moved away from Guantánamo for the purposes of interrogation, it has 
moved toward interrogating detainees on vessels. 
II. THE HYDRAULICS OF LEGAL DETENTION 
This Part will explore the factors at play in constitutional, federal 
statutory, and international law which rendered detention at sea a legally 
feasible alternative to Guantánamo. The hydraulic effect occurs, as this Part 
explores, that through the closing off of traditional legal channels, others 
emerged out of necessity. 
A. Tier One: Geneva Conventions—An Issue of Categorization 
The United States has signed and ratified each of the four Geneva 
Conventions.72 However, to have the force of law in U.S. courts a treaty 
must be considered “self-executing”73 or otherwise written into U.S. 
domestic law. For example, the Geneva Conventions are reflected in the 
 
70 See infra Part II.B. 
71 It is important to note that under the “Ker-Frisbie doctrine,” reaffirmed by the D.C. Circuit in 
United States v. Rezaq, U.S. courts retain jurisdiction over persons brought to court by forcible 
abduction, with narrow exceptions only in cases of “torture, brutality, and similar outrageous conduct.” 
134 F.3d 1121, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 
72 Treaties and States Parties to Such Treaties, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS,
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesHistoricalByCountrySelected.xsp?xp_
countrySelected=US [perma.cc/9ERJ-X6M8]; see also Noone et al., supra note 21, at 9 (“The four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 provide protections for four different classes of people: the military 
wounded and sick in land conflicts; the military wounded, sick, and shipwrecked in conflicts at sea; 
military persons and civilians accompanying the armed forces in the field who are captured and qualify 
as prisoners of war; and civilian non-combatants who are interned, live in an occupied land, or are 
otherwise in the hands of a party to an armed conflict.”). As ratified treaties, the Conventions are the 
supreme law of the land under the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI (“[A]ll Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”). 
73 See Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760, 766–67 (1988) 
(characterizing self-execution doctrine as a judicial invention). 
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Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and have also been expressly 
incorporated into certain U.S. military regulations.74 
Under the Conventions, enemy POWs are afforded certain protections, 
which may be summarized as “conditions as favourable as those for the 
forces of the Detaining Power.”75 In essence, the Detaining Party may not 
treat POWs as criminals.76 Common Article 3 of the Convention states: 
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed 
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat [out of 
action] by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely . . . [and] wounded and sick shall be 
collected and cared for.77 
Additionally, if certain persons are classified as POWs under the 
Conventions, they are entitled to added benefits.78 Under international law, 
criminals do not receive the benefits of POW status.79 The U.S. military 
argues—somewhat controversially—that POW status also does not apply 
to terrorists.80 Even if this is so, Common Article 3 still applies to detained 
terrorists and they must therefore be treated in a humane manner.81 
Whether the full protections of the Geneva Conventions apply will 
depend on how the detained persons are categorized. Upon their capture, 
“prisoners are initially called ‘detainees’ pending further determination as 
to whether they are an unlawful combatant fighting in violation of the 
international laws of war (i.e. criminals or terrorists), an innocent civilian, 
or a lawful combatant entitled to EPW status.”82 A detainee is afforded 
POW status until evidence to the contrary comes to the attention of the 
 
74 See e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2012); AR 190–8, supra note 11. 
75 GC III, supra note 25, at art. 25. 
76 Noone et al., supra note 21, at 11. 
77 GC III, supra note 25, at art. 3(1), (2) (emphasis added). 
78 Noone et al., supra note 21, at 15 (“To qualify for EPW [Enemy Prisoner of War] status, one 
must be a lawful combatant - a member of a regular armed force, or belong to forces of an unrecognized 
government, part of a levée en masse, or a member of a militia which meets the four required criteria of: 
a responsible chain of command; a recognizable, distinct, and visible insignia; open carriage of arms, 
and obedience to the laws and customs of armed conflict.”). 
79 Noone et al., supra note 21, at 15–16. 
80 Id. at 16 n.72; see, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through the 
Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 791 (2011); Noman Goheer, The Unilateral Creation of 
International Law During the “War on Terror”: Murder by an Unprivileged Belligerent is Not a War 
Crime, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 533 (2007).  
81 Noone et al., supra note 21, at 16. 
82 Id. at 17. 
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Detaining Power.83 If their status remains in question, proceedings before 
an Article Five tribunal may be appropriate.84 This Section explains how 
the different statuses of persons may affect their detention under U.S. 
policy as it operates under international law. 
1. Enemy Prisoners of War.—In certain situations—like the 
Falklands War—interning enemy POWs on board naval vessels cannot be 
avoided. While Articles 22 and 23 of the GC III prohibit any internment 
that is not “on land,”85 Article 16 of the GC II still allows for the care of 
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked enemy combatants.86 The commentary to 
the GC II notes that, when both the GC II and GC III apply to a person, the 
GC II should prevail.87 
For example, in an instance where a U.S. naval warship strikes and 
sinks an enemy vessel, both the Second and Third Conventions would be 
applicable to the enemy sailors who survived the initial sinking.88 Because 
the sailors are lawfully engaged in the conflict, they are classified as POWs 
under GC III and therefore the limitations to their internment on a naval 
warship would apply. However, because they have also been shipwrecked, 
the GC II tenets applicable to shipwrecked members of the armed forces 
would supersede GC III and necessarily obligate the U.S. warship to 
temporarily intern POWs at sea until more humanitarian measures become 
available, either on a hospital ship89 or on land.90 
This temporary detention of POWs on board naval vessels is also 
incorporated into AR 190–8, which allows for this type of detention in 
three scenarios. The first is where the POW has been recovered at sea and 
may be held on board as long as operational needs dictate.91 The second 
 
83 Id. at 17–18. 
84 Id. 
85 GC III, supra note 25, at art. 22–23. 
86 GC II, supra note 8, at art. 16. 
87 See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: II GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO 
THE WOUNDED, SICK, AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AT SEA 16 (Jean S. Pictet 
ed., 1960) [hereinafter Pictet GC II Commentary] (“It follows . . . that a wounded, sick or shipwrecked 
member of the armed forces who falls into the hands of an enemy party to the Second and Third Geneva 
Conventions will enjoy protection under both Conventions until his recovery, the Second Convention 
taking precedence over the Third where the two overlap.”).  
88 Credit to Professor Eugene Kontorovich for suggesting this hypothetical. 
89 See Pictet GC II Commentary, supra note 87, at 113 (noting that hospital ships are not 
considered “warships” under the Geneva Conventions because they are “charitable vessel[s], placed 
outside the fighting”). 
90 GC III, supra note 25, at art. 22. 
91 AR 190–8, supra note 11, at para. 2-1(f)(2)(b)(2). 
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permissible scenario is where the POW may be temporarily held on board 
during sea transit between land facilities.92 Finally, detaining POWs at sea 
is permissible when it would “appreciably improve their safety or health 
prospects.”93 Thus, U.S. policy aligns with international law for the 
detention of POWs in limited situations where GC II applies and the 
detention is temporary. 
2. Interned Civilians.—Temporary internment of civilians, or 
“protected persons” in the parlance of the GC IV, is a much simpler matter, 
legally speaking.94 Article 78 of the GC IV allows for the assigned 
residence or temporary internment of protected persons for security 
reasons.95 Protected persons also may not be removed from the occupied 
territory in which they reside unless security demands it.96 Furthermore, if 
protected persons are to be interned, they must not be interned in areas 
exposed to the dangers of combat.97 The location specifications for 
protected persons under the GC IV do not contain the same “on land” 
language requirements as is stipulated in the GC III. However, the 
commentary on the GC IV notes that the locations of internment for 
protected persons was written to be analogous to that of POWs.98 What is 
perhaps more interesting is the U.S. classification of civilians who are not 
considered protected persons, but rather “unprivileged belligerents.” 
3. Unprivileged Belligerents.—The United States departs from the 
Geneva Convention vernacular by labeling individuals “unprivileged 
belligerents.” Under the Conventions, if a person satisfies the requirements 
of a protected person under the GC IV, but “is definitely suspected of or 
engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State,” he or she is not 
entitled to protected status as a civilian.99 U.S. policies once classified these 
 
92 Id. at para. 2-1(f)(2)(b)(3). 
93 Noone et al., supra note 21, at 24 (citing AR 190–8, supra note 11). 
94 GC IV, supra note 27, at art. 4. Protected persons are defined by the GC IV as those who, “at a 
given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in 
the hands of . . . a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.” Id. 
However, this does not include members of the armed forces or any of those persons that fall within the 
purview of the other three Conventions. 
95 Id. at art. 78. 
96 Id. at art. 49. 
97 Id. at art. 83. 
98 See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO 
THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 83 (Jean S. Pictet ed., Ronald Griffin & C.W. 
Dumbleton trans., 1958). 
99 GC IV, supra note 27, at art. 5. 
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individuals as “unlawful enemy combatants,” but after heavy criticism, 
now term them “unprivileged belligerents.”100 The Military Commissions 
Act of 2009 (MCA 2009) defines an unprivileged belligerent as a person 
who: 
(A) has engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition 
partners; 
(B) has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the 
United States or its coalition partners; or 
(C) was a part of al Qaeda at the time of the alleged offense under this 
chapter.101 
The unprivileged belligerent is not afforded the protections under any 
of the Geneva Conventions and may be tried as a criminal under the laws 
of their captor.102 The United States often categorizes terrorists as 
unprivileged belligerents and therefore subject to detention at sea under the 
Laws of Armed Conflict.103 Because AR 190–8 applies to the detention of 
all civilians, and some civilians are unprivileged belligerents under the 
MCA 2009, detentions of such persons must still be temporary in nature, 
though the specific length of detention is not defined.104 This categorization 
provides a convenient legal regime wherein the United States can detain 
suspected terrorists at sea in nearly any situation, whether or not the 
Geneva Conventions apply. 
B. Tier Two: Evasion of Congressional Intent 
With the passage of the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA), Congress attempted to forbid the transfer of detainees into the 
 
100 McMillan, supra note 18, at 35; see also Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
366, 120 Stat 2600. The broad definition of unlawful enemy combatant in the Military Commissions 
Act of 2006 (MCA 2006) brought heavy criticism given the amount of discretion provided to 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals. After the Supreme Court ruled § 7 of the MCA 2006 
unconstitutional in Boumediene v. Bush, Congress passed a revised version of the MCA in 2009 which 
changed the term and definition of “unlawful enemy combatant” to “unprivileged belligerent.” 553 U.S. 
723, 724 (2008). 
101 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat 2190 
(2009). 
102 McMillan, supra note 18, at 35–41 (“The U.S. Code defines the federal crime of terrorism by 
criminalizing certain activities, but there is not a specific crime of ‘terrorism.’”). 
103 Id. at 41. 
104 See AR 190–8, supra note 11, at para. 2-1(f)(2)(b). 
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federal court system.105 Specifically, Congress harnessed its power of the 
purse to forbid the use of funds to transfer detainees from Guantánamo to 
the United States.106 The 2013 NDAA imposed further restrictions on the 
President by inhibiting his “ability to transfer detainees to Yemen and 
similar high-conflict nations, and for the first time limited the government’s 
ability to transfer non-Afghan citizens being held in Afghanistan—a 
provision that had been defeated in the prior year.”107 These provisions 
were relaxed somewhat in the 2014 NDAA108—easing restrictions on 
transferring detainees abroad—and the 2015 NDAA simply extended the 
2014 NDAA provisions pertaining to detainees.109 It is unlikely these 
restrictions will change before the 2016 presidential election. 
These congressional decisions were primarily driven by two factors: 
(1) political motivation and (2) the desire for detainees to be tried under 
military tribunals.110 First, it should come as no surprise these moves by 
Congress were politically motivated. Because the Obama Administration 
made closing Guantánamo a key part of the campaign platform, once 
Republicans took back control of the House after the 2010 midterm 
elections, there was a strategic move to make it nearly impossible for the 
Administration to transfer detainees from the facility into the federal court 
 
105 Peter Landers, Congress Bans Gitmo Transfers, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 23, 2010 12:01 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704774604576036520690885858 [https://perma.cc/
VQ4P-YVYK] (“The measure for fiscal year 2011 blocks the Department of Defense from using any 
money to move Guantánamo prisoners to the U.S. for any reason.”). 
106 Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, 
§ 1032, 124 Stat. 4351; Janet Cooper Alexander, The Law-Free Zone and Back Again, 2013 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 551, 589 (2013) (The following year, Congress passed the 2012 NDAA, which placed even 
stricter regulations on the transfer of detainees). 
107 Alexander, supra note 106, at 593 (footnote omitted). 
108 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 1034, 127 Stat. 
672, 851 (2013). 
109 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, §§ 1031–33, 
128 Stat. 3292, 3491–92 (2014). While the lame-duck Democrat-controlled Senate version of the 2015 
NDAA contained provisions that would have allowed for the transfer of detainees to civilian criminal 
courts, the House did not adopt these provisions. S. 2410, 113th Cong. § 1031(b) (2014). 
110 See Landers, supra, note 105. It is important to keep in mind that one of the early detainees tried 
in a federal court was acquitted by a federal jury of all but one charge. Id. Furthermore, conservative 
members of Congress did not believe foreign suspected terrorists should be entitled to the same rights 
as Americans in the criminal justice system. See Mike Levine & Justin Fishel, GOP Slams Obama 
Administration for Bringing Somali Terror Suspect to U.S., FOXNEWS.COM (July 6, 2011), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/07/06/gop-slams-obama-administration-for-bringing-somali-
terror-suspect-to-us/ [perma.cc/H3JQ-FKXK] (quoting Rep. Lamar Smith from Texas saying, “Why is 
it so hard for President Obama to acknowledge what the majority of Americans already know: foreign 
terrorists are enemies of America . . . . They should not be tried as common criminals, but as terrorists 
in military commissions at Guantánamo Bay.”). 
110:1303 (2016) Without Unnecessary Delay 
1321 
system for criminal prosecution. Congressman Earl Blumenauer of Oregon 
noted this: “[e]mbarrassingly, this authorization contains two key 
provisions that continue to tie the President’s hands by restricting his 
ability to transfer detainees to the United States for trial in Federal court 
and to release detainees to countries willing to take them.”111 Every year 
since, Congress has placed these restrictions on the Executive. Obama has 
issued signing statements noting these provisions defunding the transfer of 
detainees “interfere with the authority of the executive branch.”112 The 
Republican-controlled Congress gave the Obama Administration little 
choice but to leave the Guantánamo facility open and resort to other means 
of detaining and prosecuting suspected terrorists under the civilian criminal 
system rather than through military commissions.113 
One of the ways to evade this congressional intent is to detain and 
question terror suspects at sea. The case of Warsame, outlined in Part I, 
presents a classic example of this tactic. The suspected terrorist is detained 
on board a U.S. flagged vessel, which falls entirely under U.S. jurisdiction 
in accordance with the United Nations Convention on Laws of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) and the doctrine of flag-state primacy.114 The suspect is then 
questioned on board the vessel under military custody until arrival in the 
United States, where he or she is then transferred to the FBI and indicted.115 
In this way, the government circumvents any legislative restrictions 
imposed on the transfer of detainees and effectuates the Obama 
Administration’s policy of transferring detainees to federal court.116 
 
111 157 CONG. REC. E987 (statement of Rep. Blumenauer). 
112 Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on H.R. 6523 (Jan. 7, 2011), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/07/statement-president-hr-6523 [perma.cc/8AU6-
3HKH]; see also Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on H.R. 3304 (Dec. 26, 
2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/26/statement-president-hr-3304 
[perma.cc/PC82-3RLS] (“For the past several years, the Congress has enacted unwarranted and 
burdensome restrictions that have impeded my ability to transfer detainees from Guantánamo.”). 
Interestingly enough, the question as to whether the 2013 and 2014 NDAAs were unconstitutional 
interferences by Congress into the President’s control of foreign affairs was set forth before the D.C. 
District Court in Ahjam v. Obama, but the court dismissed for lack of standing. 37 F. Supp. 3d 273, 277 
(D.D.C. 2014), appeal dismissed (Jan. 16, 2015). 
113 See Alexander, supra note 106, at 573–74 (providing a history of the Department of Justice 
policy under the Obama Administration to prosecute terrorists under civilian criminal regimes rather 
than military commissions). 
114 UNCLOS, supra note 15, arts. 91 and 92 (“Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, 
save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in this Convention, shall be 
subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.”). 
115 Alexander, supra note 106, at 574. 
116 Id. 
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C. Tier Three: Expanding the “Magic Hour”117 
What emerges from the cases discussed in Part I and the efforts of the 
Department of Justice to prosecute terrorists in civilian criminal trials 
rather than military commissions is a curious development on the part of 
U.S. counterterrorism strategy after the age of Guantánamo. By first 
detaining suspected terrorists at sea under the LOAC, the government 
avoids triggering any issues of criminal process such as Miranda rights and 
presentment requirements. Then, once the needed information is gleaned 
from the suspects, they are transferred into civilian criminal custody and to 
the U.S. federal court of choice for criminal prosecution. This effect—
cleverly termed “cross-ruffing”118 by Professor Stephen Vladeck—
demonstrates how the United States is utilizing both the military and 
criminal law regimes to avoid, or “trump,” protections of either side119: 
With regard to pretrial “cross-ruffing,” the problem . . . is the possibility that 
the government might use its military detention authority (or at least the 
difficulty of remedying unlawful military detention) as a means of side-
stepping procedural protections that would otherwise kick in soon after the 
arrest of a terrorism suspect.120 
Vladeck points to several tools to potentially mitigate cross-ruffing, 
but the two most convincing are: (1) presentment and (2) the right to a 
speedy trial.121 
Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a 
defendant be presented, “without unnecessary delay before a magistrate 
 
117 “Magic hour” refers to a cinematography term wherein the crew and director have a very short 
amount of time—either at sunrise or sunset—to film outdoor scenes in nearly perfect light. Noam Kroll, 
How to Shoot with Natural Light: 10 Tips, INDIEWIRE (Oct. 7, 2013), 
http://www.indiewire.com/article/10-tips-for-using-natural-light-to-light-your-shoot [https://perma.cc/
XY9Z-FC8J]. 
118 Stephen I. Vladeck, Terrorism Prosecutions and the Problem of Constitutional “Cross-
Ruffing,” 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 709, 710 n.2 (2014) (“The term comes from a strategy often used in 
contract bridge that allows a partnership to mitigate the weaknesses of each partner’s hand by taking 
advantage of the trump cards held by the other. In hands where the declarer’s hand and that of his 
partner are unevenly distributed, the declarer will use a numerical advantage in ‘ruff’ (trump) cards to 
strategically alternate taking tricks from his hand and from his partner’s. Thus, after the declarer (or his 
partner) has claimed a trick, he will lead a weak non-trump card in a suit in which his partner is void, 
which the partner will then ‘trump,’ allowing the partnership to both claim the trick with the trump card 
and reduce the likelihood of losing tricks with weak non-trump cards later in the hand.”) (citing 
FREDDIE NORTH, BRIDGE PLAY UNRAVELLED: RECOGNITION IS EVERYTHING 12 (2003)). 
119 Id. at 711. 
120 Id. at 725. 
 121 Id. at 726. 
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judge.”122 Courts have construed Rule 5(a)’s “unnecessary delay” provision 
to impose a presumptive forty-eight-hour time limit on detentions “in the 
absence of a probable cause determination.”123 Furthermore, in 2009 the 
Supreme Court held—even within the forty-eight-hour time limit—the 
“delay for the purpose of interrogation is the epitome of ‘unnecessary 
delay.’”124 Both the detention at sea cases discussed in Part I and Vladeck’s 
article point to an emerging trend: the military is detaining suspected 
terrorists on board naval vessels as well as utilizing these ships for their 
transfer to the U.S. (in lieu of air travel) specifically to extend the 
procedural-protection-free interrogation period, or the “magic hour.”125 
We can see the U.S. government responding to this concern slightly in 
the Abu Khattalah case: “Obama administration officials have suggested 
that the delay in transporting Khattalah was not ‘unnecessary’ because 
bringing him through international waters is easier than transporting him by 
helicopter to an airport in a country in Europe or North Africa, which 
would require the permission of the host country.”126 Yet, Vladeck 
demonstrates that U.S. courts are applying Rule 5(a) by only beginning to 
count down the forty-eight-hour period once the suspected terrorist is 
transferred from military custody into civilian custody.127 
Vladeck also points to the Speedy Trial Clause of the Constitution as a 
potential mitigation tool against cross-ruffing.128 In applying the Speedy 
Trial Clause in Barker v. Wingo, the Supreme Court outlined four factors—
now known as the Barker factors—for considering whether the Clause had 
been violated: (1) the length of delay (five years being a “great time” for 
delay), (2) the governmental reasons for delay, (3) the responsibility of the 
defendant to assert their rights and, (4) any prejudice to the defendant.129 
 
122 Id. at 725; FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
123 United States v. Ayala, 289 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2002). 
124 Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 308 (2009). 
125 See generally Vladeck, supra note 118. 
126 See Hafetz, supra note 7. 
127 See Vladeck, supra note 118, at 717 (“First—and perhaps most importantly—Rule 5 only 
applies to criminal arrests, and not arrests for purposes of non-criminal detention. And although no 
court has ever considered whether military detention constitutes non-criminal detention for purposes of 
Rule 5, that conclusion should follow from the fact that military detention is putatively civil, not 
criminal. Thus, the clock Rule 5 contemplates does not begin to run until the inception of criminal 
proceedings—and so would not run until after a terrorism suspect who is initially subjected to military 
detention had been transferred out of military custody and into civilian custody for purposes of 
prosecution.”). 
128 Id. at 719–22. 
129 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). 
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This issue was presented in the 2014 case, United States v. 
Ghailiani.130 The court primarily focused on the second Barker factor and 
placed great weight on the government’s national security interest in 
holding Ghailiani for greater than the five-year period.131 This again 
demonstrates the difficulty detainees face in finding applicable law that 
pertains to them, because even in an instance that would normally be a 
clear violation of the Barker factors, the sensitivity of the case imbues the 
courts with great deference to the government and national security. 
III. THE FINAL TIER: APPLYING ARMED FORCES REGULATIONS  
TO DETAINEES 
Part II demonstrated how the United States utilizes legal categories to 
evade the Geneva Conventions with respect to detention of enemy 
prisoners of war, evade the intent of Congress by placing detainees at sea, 
and use the dual regimes of military and civilian law to expand the “magic 
hour” of procedural-protection-free interrogation time while detainees are 
transported to the United States. This Part analyses a heretofore unexplored 
source of detainee procedural protection, AR 190–8. 
As Professors Robert Chesney and Jack Goldsmith have pointed out, 
the higher level of procedural protections in the civilian criminal code, as 
opposed to military detention in armed conflict, is primarily due to the 
difference in protected interests.132 The civilian code is driven by an interest 
in protecting the innocent from wrongful conviction while military 
regulations are designed to be efficiently executed even in the fog of war.133 
But holding one suspected terrorist on board a naval warship can hardly be 
considered to be in the throes of combat, particularly when a military unit 
has sailed the vessel to the terrorist target on a mission to apprehend them. 
This—along with the subsequent interrogation—appears more like an 
extraterritorial arrest than war, especially when the primary purpose of 
 
130 United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29, 43 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1523 (2014). 
131 Id. at 49; see also Stephen Vladeck, Ghailani: Constitutional “Cross-Ruffing,” and Why I 
Worry. . ., JUST SECURITY (Oct. 25, 2013 10:25 AM), http://justsecurity.org/2511/ghailani-hard-
question-re-aumf-covered-terrorism-suspects/ [https://perma.cc/8YP2-T6RB]. 
132 Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military 
Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1088 (2008). 
133 Id. (“The exigencies of traditional armed conflict render many procedural safeguards difficult to 
implement in practice. Soldiers on the battlefield are not law enforcement officers and in most instances 
lack the time, resources, or training to collect evidence with an eye toward eventual use in court 
proceedings.”). 
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detaining suspected terrorists under a military regime is to place them in 
the custody of civilian criminal courts. 
If the interests between the civilian and military codes have begun to 
converge, so should the procedural protections.134 It is conceivable that by 
reading the civilian criminal code and AR 190–8 in pari materia, the 
presentment protections of Rule 5 can be read into the army regulations, 
and therefore begin counting at the point of detention of the suspect, not 
simply when he or she is transferred into civilian criminal custody.135 The 
pertinent language, “without unnecessary delay”136 is also echoed in AR 
190–8, which states the temporary detention at sea of enemy prisoners of 
war and civilians is to be “limited to the minimum period necessary to 
evacuate them from the combat zone or to avoid significant harm that 
would be faced if detained on land.”137 
Additionally, using the Supreme Court’s reasoning from Boumediene 
v. Bush, these detainees are being held on naval warships where U.S. 
control is absolute and indefinite, meaning they have rights under the U.S. 
Constitution.138 In holding that the Suspension Clause shall apply to 
noncitizens being held at Guantánamo, the Court reasoned that “[i]n every 
practical sense Guantánamo is not abroad; it is within the constant 
 
134 In fact, the United States has had more strict military procedural protections in the past. See 
Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 132, at 1091 (“During the Vietnam War, the U.S. military’s 
detention process was governed by ‘MACV Directive 20-5,’ promulgated by Headquarters, United 
States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. This regulation specified relatively elaborate procedural 
safeguards to be employed during the detention screening process, including a right to ‘reasonably 
available’ counsel (including an appointed JAG counsel if necessary) and a right to be present other 
than during the tribunal’s deliberations.”); see also Andrew Kent, Disappearing Legal Black Holes and 
Converging Domains: Changing Individual Rights Protection in National Security and Foreign Affairs, 
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (2015). 
135 This is in contrast to the excellent arguments made by Professors Jennifer Daskal and Steve 
Vladeck that “prompt presentment rules kick in” only once transferred into law-enforcement custody. 
Jennifer Daskal & Steve Vladeck, The Case of Abu Anas al-Libi: The Domestic Law Issues, JUST 
SECURITY (Oct. 10, 2013 9:00 AM) https://www.justsecurity.org/1850/case-abu-anas-al-libi-domestic-
law-issues/ [https://perma.cc/ZZ5B-9S6K]. This Note argues the clock starts ticking earlier under 
AR 190–8’s language, thus it would begin counting while the detainee is under military authority. 
However, the question of whether interrogation for intelligence gathering rises to the level of the 
interrogation referenced in Corley v. United States is still a question that remains unanswered. Id. 
136 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). 
137 See AR 190–8, supra note 11, at para. 2-1(f)(2)(b)(4) (emphasis added). 
138 553 U.S. 723, 768 (2008) (differentiating those prisoners in Guantánamo from those tried in a 
1950 case, Eisentrager, where detainees were being held at Landsberg Prison in Germany, the Court 
noted, “Unlike its present control over [Guantánamo], the United States’ control over the prison in 
Germany was neither absolute nor indefinite.”). 
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jurisdiction of the United States.”139 The case that a U.S. naval warship is 
not abroad, even when on the high seas, is much stronger than that of 
Guantánamo because there is no de jure sovereign such as Cuba in 
between. Even if the vessel was not a warship and under the direct control 
of the U.S. government, the law of the flag doctrine would still provide that 
the vessel itself was the territory of the United States as long as it was 
flying the U.S. flag. Therefore, the full force of the Constitution would 
apply, including the right to a speedy trial. 
A. Army Regulation 190–8—Expanded Applicability 
U.S. AR 190–8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, 
Civilian Internees and Other Detainees (AR 190–8), expressly incorporates 
the Geneva Conventions.140 It must, therefore, seem controversial that U.S. 
policy allows for the internment of enemy prisoners of war at sea when 
Article 22 of the Geneva Conventions textually prohibits it.141 However, the 
regulations allow for the temporary detention of enemy prisoners of war 
and civilians, “limited to the minimum period necessary to evacuate them 
from the combat zone or to avoid significant harm that would be faced if 
detained on land.”142 Recently, detainees have begun to present questions 
 
139 Id. at 769. 
140 AR 190–8, supra note 11, at para. 1-1b. The name of AR 190–8 is misleading because it is the 
controlling regulation for all of the U.S. Armed Forces regarding detainees. See Aamer v. Obama, 58 F. 
Supp. 3d 16, 21 (D.D.C. 2014). 
141 Noone et al., supra note 21, at 25. 
142 See AR 190–8, supra note 11, para. 2-1(f)(2)(b), which outlines the special policy for detention 
on board naval war vessels: 
(1) Detention of EPW[Enemy Prisoners of War]/RP[Retained Personnel] on board naval vessels 
will be limited.  
(2) EPW recovered at sea may be temporarily held on board as operational needs dictate, 
pending a reasonable opportunity to transfer them to a shore facility, or to another vessel for 
transfer to a shore facility.  
(3) EPW/RP may be temporarily held aboard naval vessels while being transported between 
land facilities. They may also be treated and temporarily quartered aboard naval vessels 
incidental to their treatment, to receive necessary and appropriate medical attention if such 
detention would appreciably improve their health or safety prospects.  
(4) Holding of EPW/RP on vessels must be temporary, limited to the minimum period necessary 
to evacuate them from the combat zone or to avoid significant harm that would be faced if 
detained on land. 
(5) Use of immobilized vessels for temporary holding of EPW/RP is not authorized without 
SECDEF approval. 
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pertaining to AR 190–8 in court, presumably because, as discussed in Part 
II, there are few other sources of law available to them.143 
Significantly, in a 2013 case, Al Warafi v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit 
held, despite Congress’s explicit statement in the Military Commissions 
Act of 2006 (MCA 2006) that a detainee may not invoke the Geneva 
Conventions in a habeas proceeding, a detainee may invoke the Geneva 
Conventions through AR 190–8.144 
There are some caveats. Specifically the decision read, “in a habeas 
proceeding such as this, a detainee may invoke Army Regulation 190–8 to 
the extent that the regulation explicitly establishes a detainee’s entitlement 
to release from custody.”145 This “entitlement” language has been 
interpreted as a restriction by the D.C. District Court in Aamer v. Obama, 
which held that for a detainee to invoke AR 190–8 and the Geneva 
Conventions it incorporates, the detainee must first “explicitly establish” 
their “entitlement” to release from custody under the Regulation.146 
Perhaps more importantly, these cases demonstrate a willingness by 
the D.C. Circuit to interpret AR 190–8 as domestic U.S. law that it “may 
and must analyze” in the context of detainee proceedings in federal court, 
not just as a rule for military commissions.147 While some may focus on the 
explicit incorporation of the Geneva Conventions into this Regulation, this 
has limited effect due to the categorization of detainees as “unprivileged 
belligerents” as demonstrated in Part II. What may carry more weight is a 
duty of the courts to apply the procedural protections of AR 190–8 to 
detainees at sea. 
B. Delay for Further Interrogation is the Epitome of  
Unnecessary Delay 
As outlined above, AR 190–8 stipulates that the authority to hold 
POWs, Retained Personnel (RP), and “other detainees” is limited.148 
 
143 See, e.g., Al Warafi v. Obama, 716 F.3d 627 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2134 
(2014) (mem.); Aamer v. Obama, 58 F. Supp. 3d 16 (D.D.C. 2014); Ameziane v. Obama, 58 F. Supp. 
3d 99, 102 (D.D.C. 2014). 
144 716 F.3d at 629. Notably, while Section 7 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 was 
invalidated in Boumediene v. Bush because the Supreme Court deemed it an unconstitutional 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, Section 5 remains unaffected. 553 U.S. 723, 792 (2008). 
145 Al Warafi, 716 F.3d at 629. 
146 Aamer, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 23 (citing Al Warafi, 716 F.3d at 629). 
147 Al Warafi, 716 F.3d at 629. 
148 AR 190–8, supra note 11, at para. 2-1(f)(2)(b) (“Special policy pertaining to the temporary 
detention of EPW, CI, RP and other detained persons aboard United States Naval Vessels.”) (emphasis 
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Specifically, it is “limited to the minimum period necessary to evacuate 
them from the combat zone or to avoid significant harm that would be 
faced if detained on land.”149 This language is of course very similar to that 
of “without unnecessary delay” of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.150 The temporal limitations of Rule 5(a) have often 
been discussed in criminal proceedings and any dispositive analysis merits 
another look. 
The common interpretation is that Rule 5(a) establishes a forty-eight-
hour time limit for criminals to be presented before a magistrate judge.151 
The Supreme Court discussed this temporal limit at length in County of 
Riverside v. McLaughlin.152 The Court, in upholding the forty-eight-hour 
requirement of Rule 5(a), noted there may still be a violation even if the 
defendant was presented within forty-eight hours in cases where the 
defendant can prove he or she was delayed unreasonably.153 The Court 
provided several examples of what constituted an unreasonable delay, 
including “delays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify 
the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or 
delay for delay’s sake.”154 The Supreme Court reiterated this sentiment in 
Corley v. United States when Justice Souter wrote, “[D]elay for the purpose 
of interrogation is the epitome of ‘unnecessary delay.’”155 Strikingly, the 
entire purpose of detention at sea appears to be to prolong the “magic hour” 
interrogation period of detainees. 
One may argue that placement of the detainee on board the vessel is 
simply a transport mechanism to bring the detainee to the custody of the 
United States, and that flying the detainee back is not feasible due to 
conflict or sovereign concerns in the countries nearby.156 Indeed, the 
 
added). That this section of AR 190–8 applies to other detained persons is particularly important 
because the D.C. Circuit places a stringent analysis on the categorization of persons to whom this law is 
applied. See Al Warafi, 716 F.3d at 629–32 (denying a petition for writ of habeas corpus because 
appellant could not establish he was “medical personnel” within the meaning of Article 24 of the First 
Geneva Convention because the Taliban did not issue him official identification as such). 
149 See AR 190–8, supra note 11, para. 2-1(f)(2)(b) (emphasis added). 
150 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). 




155 556 U.S. 303, 308 (2009). 
156 See Hafetz, supra note 7; see also Michael S. Schmidt & Eric Schmitt, Questions Raised Over 
Trial for Ahmed Abu Khattala in Benghazi Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2014), 
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Supreme Court has noted that courts shall provide flexibility in the forty-
eight-hour limitation for the purposes of transport.157 However, nearly all 
naval warships contain at minimum a helicopter pad for transport, and it is 
entirely plausible that the detainee could be flown by helicopter to a 
friendlier country in the Northern Mediterranean with which the United 
States has an extradition treaty (e.g., Italy)158 and then transported by air to 
the United States. 
The specific definition of unreasonable delay for shipboard 
interrogation while being transported was provided by the D.C. Circuit in 
the 1988 case of Yunis v. United States.159 The FBI arrested Fawaz Yunis—
a suspect in a 1985 plane hijacking—in international waters off the coast of 
Cyprus.160 While ultimately holding that the four-day interrogation on 
board the U.S.S. Butte was reasonable, the court made clear that—had it 
been able to make a factual determination that Yunis’s journey was 
specifically scheduled to purposely create a delay—it may have held 
otherwise.161 
This is not to say that an interrogation at this interval may be crucially 
important to national security, but courts should be aware that detention at 
sea becomes a de facto method of further interrogation in a procedural-
protection-free zone under the guise of transport, and would violate 
McLaughlin and Corley under the civilian regime.162 
C. Consequences of an Army Regulation 190–8 Violation 
If a court determines that the interrogation of a detainee during 
transportation by sea is a violation of AR 190–8, it is necessary to 




157 McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56–57 (“Courts cannot ignore the often unavoidable delays in 
transporting arrested persons from one facility to another.”). 
158 Bilateral Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Italy, Oct. 19, 1983, 1983 U.S.T. 421. 
159 859 F.2d 953, 967–69 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
160 Id. at 954. 
161 Id. at 968 (“To the extent the [trial] judge found that the trip via the Butte could have been made 
in less time, we accept the factual determination but disagree that the extra time in transit was not a 
‘reasonable’ delay.”). 
162 Many advocates will remember the untimely misstep of Paul Clement in arguing Rumsfeld v. 
Padilla, where he assured Justice Ginsburg that the Executive would not resort to torture mere hours 
before CBS broadcast the first photos of Abu Ghraib. Jason Zengerle, The Paul Clement Court, N.Y. 
MAG. (Mar. 18, 2012), http://nymag.com/news/features/paul-clement-2012-3/index2.html 
[perma.cc/A84Z-PMC2]. 
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be a suppression of the detainee’s statements made during the interrogation 
per the McNabb–Mallory rule. This rule renders confessions made during 
periods of detention that violate the presentment requirements of Rule 5(a) 
inadmissible.163 In the case of Yunis, the court determined that “principal 
concern of the McNabb–Mallory rule” was absent from the case because a 
magistrate judge had issued a warrant prior to Yunis’s arrest.164 This is 
contrary to the recent cases of detention at sea where the person is first 
apprehended, held, and interrogated on board the ship, and only arrested 
upon their arrival in the United States.165 Thus the principal concern of an 
investigatory arrest under McNabb–Mallory would apply. 
While the suppression of statements may appear to be a weak remedy 
at first glance, the application of this rule is important because it would 
allow the U.S. government to weigh the consequences as to whether it is 
more important that the information be gleaned from the detainee in the 
interest of national security, or that the detainee’s statements be admitted at 
trial. 
Because military detention is primarily construed as civil detention 
and Rule 5(a) is a requirement in criminal proceedings, some may argue the 
two should not be read as analogous. However, as the First Circuit 
acknowledged in United States v. Encarnacion, “the difference between 
civil and criminal detentions may appear formalistic, and that in practical 
terms an unnecessarily long detention under civil law is no better for the 
detainee than one under the criminal law.”166 Even if the period of military 
detention may be considered civil, once it is clear the government’s intent 
is to prosecute the detainee in the criminal system, any separation between 
the civil and criminal regimes becomes less distinct and requires the 
judicial system to cast a blind eye toward this reality in determining the 
language of Rule 5(a) is inapplicable. 
CONCLUSION 
The development of detention law has led to a hydraulic effect for the 
detention and interrogation of suspected terrorists, moving it out of 
 
163 Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 303 (2009). 
164 Yunis, 859 F.2d at 969 (noting that because “[i]n the majority of criminal cases, police have no 
warrant for the arrest,” presentment before a magistrate is essential so probable cause may be 
determined). 
165 See, e.g., Letter to Judge Colleen McMahon, supra note 53, at 1–3 (noting that Warsame was 
apprehended on April 19, 2011, interrogated, and only arrested “on or about July 3, 2011”). 
166 239 F.3d 395, 399 n.4 (1st Cir. 2001). 
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Guantánamo and potentially on to the sea. As Professors Chesney and 
Goldsmith have alluded to, there is a convergence in the interests of 
detention between the civil and military regimes. To that end, AR 190–8 
may constitute one of the only legal procedural protections on which 
detainees may rely. Because of the similarity in language and purpose of 
AR 190–8 and Rule 5(a), courts may read the two in pari materia and take 
into account Supreme Court language condemning additional delay for 
purposes of further interrogation. It is crucial to understand detention at sea 
not as transportation between facilities, but as a potential guise for 
extending procedural-protection-free interrogation of detainees to ensure 
that future administrations cannot abuse this law-free zone. 
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